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WASHINGTON
LAW REVIEW
VoLUMn, III. MARCH, 1928 NUMBER 1
RIGHTS OF VENDEES UNDER
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS OF SALE
T has been held by the Supreme Court of the State of Wash-
mgton in a number of cases, that an executory contract to sell
either real or personal property, generally designated as a condi-
tional sales or installment contract, does not create in the vendee
or buyer any legal or equitable interest in the property In so far
as the rule applies to real property, there was a disposition on
the part of many members of the bar to adversely criticise those
decisions and to become fearful of their effect upon the status of
the vendee's rights, after the court decided the case of Ashford v.
Reese," in which the rule was given as the basis for holding that
the vendee is entitled to rescind the contract, upon destruction of
the subject-matter while the contract is unperformed, in other
words, that loss caused by destruction of the property without
fault of the vendee falls upon the vendor.
The vendee having no interest in the res, it was feared that a
conveyance or encumbrance of the property by the vendor would
be held superior under all circumstances to the rights of the
vendee, leaving the vendee with only a right of action for damages
against his vendor, and, if not superior where the grant or encum-
brance is taken with notice, that placing the contract of record or
possession of the property would not constitute constructive notice
of the vendee's rights.
This paper is written in support of the rule and to demonstrate
that there is no reasonable basis for fear as to the effect of its
application upon the vendee's rights, not in support of the use
of the rule as a premise for holding that loss resulting from de-
struction of the property must be borne by the vendor.
The first principle of argument requires that terms be defined.
1132 Wash. 649, 233 Pac. 29 (1925).
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The word "interest" is an indefinite term which is given various
meanings. It is frequently used in referring to pure contractual
rights pertaining to property, that is, where the contract creates
no ownership or title in the property It is also used, and in a
more accurate sense, as expressing the idea of ownership or title.
The expression, "equitable interest," is also used in different
senses. It is necessary to arrive at the meaning given to the latter
expression by our court when it formulated the rule under discus-
sion, in order to intelligently discuss the subject for consideration.
Ownership or title is created only by a present transfer or con-
veyance. When, according to legal formalities, it creates a "legal"
interest. When a contract for ownership or title has been per-
formed by the vendee and he has become entitled to a present
transfer or conveyance, 2 or when there has been an attempted
transfer or conveyance which has failed by reason of failure to
observe the legal formalities,s a court of equity deems that to have
been done which should have been performed, and gives effect to
it as a present transfer or conveyance, which vests the vendee with
what is termed an "equitable" interest. It is clear from our deci-
sions that the terms used in the rule were intended to express this
meaning of legal and equitable interest.4
The court used the terms in accordance with correct legal ter-
minology The court cannot be said to have conveyed the idea
that contractual rights pertaining to property have no effect of
limiting the acquisition of adverse rights. It would be contrary
to fundamental legal principles for a court to hold that such con-
tracts have no effect upon the right of the owner of the property,
or his successor in interest, to deal with or dispose of that property
as he sees fit. If there were nothing more than the statement of
the rule itself by which to gauge the court's meaning, it could
not be assumed that the court intended thereby to hold that such
contracts are a nullity in so far as is concerned the right of the
vendee to receive title, when he has performed his contract, from
the other party to the contract or one who acquires his interest with
notice of it.
The rule itself, when its terms are given a proper meaning, is
sound. It is elementary that the court, when interpreting a con-
tract, should give effect to the intention of the parties to it as
'Ahern v. Ahern, 31 Wash. 337, 71 Pac. 1023 (1903).
'Pease v. Baxter 12 Wash. 573, 41 Pac. 899 (1895).
I Younkman v. Hillman, 53 Wash. 663, 102 Pac. 773 (1909).
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disclosed by the language they employed, that intention is always
the controlling factor.9 There is a marked difference between a
promise to sell and a present transfer or conveyance of an interest
in property 6 In the one case, a transfer or conveyance is merely
contemplated, in the other it is completed. To hold that an
interest in the res passes in the former case, would be making a
contract for the parties instead of interpreting the one made by
them. The Washington rule but gives effect to the expressed
intention of the parties. The words "will sell" or "agrees to
sell," especially when there is also a provision that the title shall
remain in the vendor until performance by the vendee, clearly
express the intention of the parties, and the purpose of the rule
is to give effect to that intention.
It may be that under the common law an executory contract
to sell real property was treated in equity "as if already specifically
executed," and the "purchaser" held to be the "equitable owner
of the lands, and the vendor of the purchase money," as indicated
by quotations found in Judge Tolman's dissenting opinion in Ash-
ford v. Reese, supra. If so, our court is to be congratulated on
its departure from that rule, founded on a fiction, and on its adop-
tion of a rule giving effect to the expressed intention of the parties.
The rule has been logically applied, according to the meaning
of its terms and its purpose, in holding that the wife is not a
necessary party to a declaration of forfeiture, a relinquishment
or an assignment of the rights of the marital community arising
out of such contracts, prior to performance by the vendee, for the
reason that the husband is the statutory agent of the community
with authority to dispose of choses in action and all kinds of per-
sonal property;7 in holding that such contracts are valid when
signed by the parties to be charged, though not executed with the
formalities required for the execution of deeds;8 and in holding
that the heirs of the wife have no interest an the realty itself but
do have an interest in the contract, the chose an action, an pro-
portion to the share of the payments made with community funds.9
Any rule which gives effect to the intention of the parties to a
5 Yak ma Sash & Box' Go. v. Kopp, 140 Wash. 422, 249 Pac. 786 (1926).
a Ayer, "Uniform SaZes Act," 2 WASH. L. RPv. 67.
7Tieton Hotel Co. v. Manhern, 75 Wash. 641, 135 Pac. 658 (1913)
Converse v. LaBarge, 92 Wash. 282, 158 Pac. 958 (1916) Pan v. Morrson,
125 Wash. 267, 216 Pao. 29 (1923).
1 First National Bank of Kennewick v. Conway, 87 Wash. 506, 151 Pac.
1129 (1915).
'In re Kuhn's Estate, 132 Wash. 678, 233 Pac. 293 (1925).
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contract is intrinsically sound and can work no hardship on the
parties. However, a formula which serves to give effect to the
intention of the parties when applied to facts out of which it
grew, may be so applied that it has a directly opposite result.
Courts do not always look to the reason of a rule before applying
it and, consequently, rules sometimes receive condemnation which
should be directed to a particular application of it. That is what
has happened to the one under consideration.
In the dissenting opinions to Ashford v. Reese, supra, and Holt
Manufacturing Company v. Jaussaud,10 the general rule that no
legal or equitable interest in real or personal property passes to
the vendee while such a contract remains executory is adversely
criticised. But the dissents on that ground should be regarded as
protests against misapplications of the rule rather than well con-
sidered disapprovals of the rule itself.
In the Holt Manufacturing Company case, involving personalty,
it is also held that the risk of loss while the contract remains execu-
tory falls on the seller. Not only is it held in those cases that the
vendors or sellers are entitled to no further payments under the
contracts, but that payments made by the vendee or buyer may be
recovered by him. Whether or not the vendor would be entitled
to the reasonable value of the use of the property as an offset was
not considered.
While our court's holding in the two last mentioned cases, that
the vendor or seller bears the loss resulting from destruction of
the property prior to performance, has the approval of an eminent
jurist,1 it would seem that a different position might well have
been taken.
There are at least two kinds of executory contracts to sell prop-
erty, one in which there is a delivery of the property to the vendee
and another in which there has been no delivery of the property
at the time of loss or destruction. By the latter, the vendor is under
obligation to deliver the property Where the property is lost
or destroyed while in the possession of the vendor, he fails to per-
form his contractual obligation to deliver. But where it is lost
or destroyed after being delivered to the vendee, the vendor has
performed that important obligation under the contract and there
is no failure on his part to perform--of course, he is able and
1"132 Wash. 667, 233 Pac. 35 (1925).
"Mr. Justice Harlan F Stone's "Equitable Conversion by Contract,"
13 CoL. L. REV. 369.
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willing to execute the instruments required of hn by the contract,
upon the performance of the vendee's promise to make the pay-
ments specified in the contract. Performance or non-performance
by the vendor ought to be the factor of controlling importance
in such cases, in whom the title lies is a matter of total mdifference.
In neither the Ashford nor the Holt Manufacturing Company
case did the vendor fail in the performance of his obligations.
Furthermore, where there has been a delivery, the intention of
the parties that the loss shall fall on the vendee is clear. The
intention is just the opposite where there has been no delivery,
in the absence of express language to the contrary Hence, deci-
sions in those cases in accordance with Judge Bridges' and Judge
Parker's dissenting opinions, would have had a sounder foundation
upon which to rest.
The Uniform Sales Act of 1925,12 so far as personalty is con-
cerned, makes the loss fall upon the one who should bear it, the
buyer. However, the question of upon whom the loss resulting
from destruction should fall is beside the question.
Judge Tolnan, in dissenting, made argumentative assertions
which gave rise to the doubts following those decisions. In his
effort to give reasons for an apparently strong feeling that an
mnjustice was being done the vendor and seller in those cases, he
expressed fears concerning the consequences of the rule that a
vendee or buyer under such a contract has no legal or equitable
interest in the res, which should not have been expected to become
realities, and which, in part at least, have been proven groundless
by subsequent decisions.
He states, as a part of his argument against the rule itself.
"The recording of his contract will avail him nothing
because, having no interest in the real estate, the con-
tract evidences no interest and is not entitled to be re-
corded, and consequently cannot be constructive notice
to anybody "
But the contrary has long been the law, and is a settled rule of
property in Washington.
In Bernard v. Benson,13 it is squarely held that the recording of
such a contract imparts constructive notice. It is true the court
gave as one reason for its decision that the contract came within
12Rem. Comp. Stat. §5836-22; P. C. §6227-22.
"58 Wash. 191, 108 Pac. 439 (1910).
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the meaning of the words, "deeds, grants and transfers of real
property," contained in the recording statute, but gave as the
principal reason for the decision that it was the settled custom
to consider the recording of such contracts as notice and that the
custom had become a rule of property, as any other holding "would
be productive of great mischief." The decision has stood as the
law for a long time, and it is outside of the realm of possibility
that the court would now overrule that decision and destroy rights
acquired on the faith of it. That construction of the recording
statute is now as much a part of it as if such contracts were
expressly mentioned therein. 1aa
Judge Tolman, no doubt, did not have in mind Bernard v.
Benson when that statement was made, and having m mind
Schaefer v. Gregory,14 which is cited in support of the majority
opinion in Ashford v. Reese and in which the opinion was written
by the same judge, there is some excuse for his conclusion. In
the Schaefer case, it was held that a vendee of such a contract who
was made a party to eminent domain proceedings affecting the
realty but did not appear therein, was unaffected by the proceed-
ings, notwithstanding the eminent domain statute provided for
making parties to the proceedings and determining their damages
"all tenants, encumbrancers, and others interested for the taking
or injuriously affecting such land." The reason given by the court
for so holding was that "the vendee has no interest in the land,
that he has no right in rem, but one sn personam against the vendor
in the event of breach upon the vendor's part."
The court, in deciding the Schaefer case, entirely overlooked the
reason for the rule. The opinion was apparently written without
thought of the fact that the intention of the parties as disclosed
by the language used is of primary importance and that the rule
is merely a formula which gives effect to the intention as expressed
in executory contracts to sell. Had the court looked to the four
corners of the statute for the intention of the legislature, instead
of gauging it by a formula, a different result would probably have
been reached.
It is unbelievable that Bernard v. Benson will be affected by the
"a Since this article was written the legislature has set all doubts on
this point at rest. See Rem. Comp. Stat. §10596-3; P C. §1914-3, providing
that executory contracts for the sale of real property, when acknowledged,
may be recorded, and that such recording imparts constructive notice of
the vendee's rights under the contract.
14 112 Wash. 408, 192 Pac. 968 (1920)
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Schaefer decision. The latter can be considered only as a construc-
tion of the eminent domain statute, just as the former is limited m
its effects to the general recording statute. However, the Schaefer
case should be overruled or the eminent domain statute amended to
remedy the situation created by that case.
Specific statutory provision is made for giving record notice of
executory contracts relating to personalty '5
Recording or filing, therefore, gives constructive notice of execu-
tory contracts of both realty and personalty It cannot be said that
statutory notice is without effect, upon the theory that since the
vendee or buyer has no equitable or legal interest in the res a pur-
chaser or encumbrancer may treat the contract as a nullity so far
as he is concerned. The only purpose of providing for notice by
recording or filing is to make his rights in the property subject to
the contractual rights of the vendee or buyer. Contractual rights
pertaining to property, as distinguished from equitable or legal
interests in the property itself, are by that legislation and always
have been recognized as subjects of legal protection.
Possession by the vendee or buyer also constitutes notice. It is a
familiar rule that possession is notice to all the world of the rights
of the possessor. That rule has never been limited to the protection
of ownership or title. Any contractual rights which the party in
possession may have pertaining to the property, regardless of
whether or not such rights have ripened into title or ownership of
the whole or any part of the property, are protected by such notice,
and the successors in interest of the title holder or owner take sub-
ject to the contractual rights of the possessor. 6
A judgment creditor or a purchaser on execution at his own sale
stands in the position of the debtor, and lack of notice adds nothing
to ins rights." The judgment or a levy of execution does not con-
stitute a lien as against the vendee or buyer.18 (The judgment
creditor is not without a remedy He may sell the vendor's or
seller's interest in the property under execution and notify the
15 Rem. Comp. Stat. 3790-3791, P. C. §§ 9767-9768.
"Noyes v. Hall, 97 U. S. 34, 24 L. ed. 909, cited with approval in Den-
rns v. Northern Pacific By Co., 20 Wash. 330, 55 Pac. 210 (1898) Field v.
Coppzng, Agnew 4 Scales, 65 Wash. 359, 118 Pac. 329 (1911), an oral lease
case-such a lease creates no interest in the res. 24 Cyc. 958; 39 Cyc.
1646-1651.
27'White v. McSorley, 47 Wash. 21, 91 Pac 243 (1907) Ransom V.
Wickstrom & Go., 84 Wash. 423, 146 Pac. 1041 (1915).
"McDonald v. Curtis, 119 Wash. 384, 205 Pac. 1041 (1922), 23 Cxc.
1382; 39 Cxc. 1657-1659.
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vendee that he has acqmred the same, 9 or he may cause garnish-
ment to issue, and thus realize on his judgment. Unless he does so,
when the contract is paid out, the interest of the vendor or seller
terminates and the lien ceases to have anything on which to oper
ate.)
In Cunningham v. Long,20 a successor in interest of a vendor of
personalty was held in no better position than his vendor, and as
the vendor had given an extension of time for payments no for
feiture could be had without giving the vendee an opportunity to
pay
Possession is not the equivalent of ownership of or title to prop-
erty, but one in possession under such a contract, like any other
bailee, may maintain an action for conversion of or injury to the
property Oros v. Allen,21 approving Stotts v. Puget Sound, Etc.
Co., 2 in which it is said
"This court, as previously noted in this opinon, has
held that a vendee under a conditional sale has no title,
but it does not follow that the law will not define and
protect such rights as he may have."
The full value of the property may be recovered where wrong-
fully converted notwithstanding only part of the payments have
been made.2
3
The decision in Ashford v. Reese, supra, has not altered the law
in such respect. In Katemva v. Snyder,24 it is said
"The respondent defends the judgment on the ground
that the appellants have only a conditional contract for
the purchase of the land occupied by them, and therefore
have no right to complain of any action of the respondent,
citing our case of Ashford v. Reese, 132 Wash. 649, 233
Pac. 29, where we held that an executory contract for the
sale of real estate creates no title, legal or equitable, in the
vendee. But we did not hold that such a contract was a
nullity Unquestionably, as between the parties to this
action, it is sufficient upon which appellants can base
their right to possession of the land which they are pur-
chasing, and sufficient to authorize them to forbid any
person to interfere with that possession."
19 39 Cyc. 1657, note 75.
"134 Wash. 437, 235 Pac. 964 (1925).
21133 Wash. 268, 233 Pac. 314 (1925).
"94 Wash. 339, 162 Pac. 519 (1917).
2Messenger v. Murphy, 33 Wash. 359, 74 Pac. 475 (1903).2"143 Wash. 172, 254 Pac. 857 (1927).
VENDEES UNDER EXECUTORY CONTRACT
The vendee is entitled to declare a homestead in the subject
matter of an executory contract.':
Where land or any estate or interest in land is the subject mat-
ter of the contract, specific -performance will be invariably de-
creed.26 The same relief will be granted as against the vendor's
grantee who takes with actual or constructive notice." In Pratt v.
Rhodes, 28 it is said in discussing Ashford v. Reese
"It was not there meant that an executory contract for
the sale of land vests no right in the vendee which the
court will enforce at the suit of the vendee. It is not held
that such a contract is a nullity The contract, on the
contrary, has all of the validity that any other executory
contract has which is duly and regularly executed by par-
ties competent to contract. Nor will the courts in every
instance relegate the vendee to an action in damages
where the contract is breached by the vendor. If equity,
justice and good conscience require that the contract be
specifically enforced, the courts will enforce it specifically
The cited case, and the cases referred to therein, do not
announce a contrary doctrine. To hold that an executory
contract for the sale of land does not by its mere execution
vest in the vendee any title or interest in the land con-
tracted to be conveyed, is not to hold that the vendor may
deprive the vendee of the benefit of the contract by his
mere whin or caprice."
Judge Tolman also questioned whether the vendee has anything
which could be insured. The answer is that there are many kinds
of loss other than legal or equitable interests in property Risks
which may be insured against are matters of contract. Where
there is an intention to insure against a risk arising out of a con-
tractual relation and independent of title, the contract of insur-
ance, of course, will be given effect by the courts. There is noth-
ing against public policy in such an insurance contract. The
court, in Washington Fire Relief Assoctatson v. Albro,29 had occa-
sion to set the question at rest, saying-
"So, also, we think, he had an insurable interest in
the barn, notwithstanding it may have been legally the
separate property of his wife. As is shown by the eases
Desmond v. Shotwel, 142 Wash. 187, 252 Pac. 692 (1927).
Cyc. 552-553.
2136 Cyc. 761-764.
=:142 Wash. 411, 253 Pac. 640 (1927).
='137 Wash. 31, 241 Pac. 356 (1925).
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collected in 20 C. J 20, under par. 3, the term 'interest,'
as used in the phrase 'insurable interest,' is not limited to
property or ownership in the subject matter of the insur-
ance, that where the interest of the insured in, or his
relation to, the property is such that he will be benefited
by its continued existence, or will suffer a direct pecuniary
loss by its destruction, his contract of insurance will be
upheld, although he has no legal or equitable title."
In all the foregoing citations, it is assumed or recognized that
contractual rights pertaining to property, notwithstanding no
present transfer or conveyance takes place, are given effect by the
courts as against the other party to the contract and all persons
claiming through him except innocent purchasers or encum-
brancers. Almost numberless decisions, in which such rights have
been protected, might be collected. Failure to distinguish between
contractual rights pertaining to, and an interest in property, is
responsible for the confusion and doubts.
Criticism of the rule that no interest, legal or equitable, passes
by an executory contract, has been for the most part based on
precedent, which lays down a contrary rule as to realty contracts
only The same language means exactly the same thing, whether
it be used in a contract relating to realty or personalty No logi-
cal reason can be assigned for holding that identical language when
relating to real estate shall be given an effect directly opposite
to that given when personal property is the subject matter of the
contract.
It is believed by many that it is not to the best interests of the
marital community for the husband to have the right to assign or
transfer contracts pertaining to realty without the consent of the
wife. But that is a matter for legislation, and that right may be
abrogated by an enactment simply requiring both members of the
marital community to join in such assignments and transfers.
It has been proposed that legislation be enacted providing in
effect that executory contracts to sell property be deemed to
transfer or convey an interest therein. Legislation of that kind
would be far from satisfactory It would amount to an interfer
ence, or attempted interference, with the right to contract. It
would give an effect to the language of the contract directly
opposite to its intended and evident meaning. If it should be
construed as declaratory of the common law, it might work disas-
ter to a great many titles. Such proposals have nothing to com-
mend them. Undesirable consequences flowing from the applica-
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tion of the rule-n most instances, from an incorrect application
of it-can be remedied by more appropriate and less harmful legis-
lation.
While confusion of terms has resulted in incorrect applications
of the rule that no equitable or legal interest in the property passes
to the vendee under an executory contract to sell, in the Schaefer,
Ashford and Holt Manufactumng Company cases, and nfortunate
language was used in the dissenting opinions, there is no reasonable
probability of the court holding that the vendee's contractual
rights in the property will not be fully protected by the courts.
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